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Considering the necessity and future role of nuclear energy as relevant to the climate problem, 
we have focused on the period to the year 2065. For quantification of the required emission 
reduction we have used IEA WEO 2009 and WEO 2011 data as presented in their Reference 
strategies predicting emissions with business as usual practices, and WEO 450 Energy strategies 
which show the time development of allowed emissions consistent with a limit on the global 
temperature increase of 2 ºC and the peak CO2 concentration of 450 ppm. By extrapolating these 
data to the year 2065 we obtain 77.4 GtCO2-eq for Reference emission and 10 GtCO2-eq for WEO 
450 strategy allowing emission, resulting in 67.4 GtCO2-eq reduction required to come down to 
sustainable WEO 450 trajectory. The large contributions to emission reduction from fusion energy 
and fossil fuel with carbon separation and storage are not likely. Main carbon non-emitting sources 
assumed in the years up to 2065 are proven technology nuclear fission and renewable sources. In 
our specified strategy aimed to achieve WEO 450 target we assumed an energy mix including 
nuclear power build-up in the period 2025-2065 to the level of 3300 GW in 2065. With the resulting 
nuclear contribution of 25.2 GtCO2 to the total required emission reduction of 67.4 GtCO2, what 
remains for renewable sources, energy saving and increased efficiency of energy use to contribute 
are prodigious 42.2 GtCO2-eq. Assuming that energy saving and more efficient energy use will by 
2065 effect an annual reduction between 10 to 16 GtCO2-eq, remaining 26.2 to 32.2 GtCO2, 
respectively 27290 and 33540 TWh would be the task for renewable energy sources. Our estimates 
about contribution of renewable sources going as far as 2065 are based on EREC prediction for EU 
and on our extension to world total with EREC and GWEC prediction as a guide. Our high, but still 
credible estimates of predicted world renewable energy contribution by 2065 come to the similar 
figures between 29260 and 36180 TWh. However, without nuclear contribution in 2065, renewable 
energy contribution would have to be doubled, practically impossible task in the time period in 
consideration. Resulting contributions by renewable sources, probably their upper limits, allow 
some conclusions about the role of nuclear energy in future decades. By combining highest 
contributions from energy saving, efficiency increase and other measures to reduce emission, apart 
from energy production, with highest prediction for renewable sources contribution, we obtain the 
minimum nuclear energy requirement of about 2190 GW in 2065. This minimum nuclear strategy 
should be planned and prepared for, unless there is strong evidence that other carbon free energy 
sources (CCS or fusion) could be developed in time. Expansion of nuclear power by about 1800 
GW by 2065 would come from different and already developed industrial sector, which can give its 
contribution to the energy mix, without obstructing the build-up of renewable sources. It would not 





The future of nuclear energy will be essentially determined by its role in reduction of carbon 
emission and prevention of associated unacceptable climate changes. In trying to assess the role of 
nuclear energy in resolving the carbon emission problem we focus on the several next decades 
when the choice of carbon free energy sources will not include large scale energy production by 
nuclear fusion or coal power plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS). Starting with generally 
accepted recommendations by IPCC about carbon emission reductions, the question about the 
future of nuclear (fission) energy is really the question whether required emission reduction in the 
next decades can be achieved with renewable sources alone, or the contribution from nuclear power 
must also be included. First step towards the answer is to quantify the emission reduction target. 
Present consensus is that global temperature increase be limited to 2 degrees Celsius. This limit was 
adopted in Copenhagen Accord [1] and in EU energy strategy [2]. Global endorsement reflecting 
IPCC recommendations was given at the UN climate change conference in Cancun in December 
2010 [3, 4]. In order to obtain a quantitative guidance on the carbon emission reduction required to 
keep global temperature increase below 2 ºC we use the WEO 2009 and subsequent WEO 2011 
energy strategy designed to achieve this target by limiting the increase of greenhouse-gases (GHG) 
concentration below 450 parts per million of CO2-eq. That strategy was presented in the 
International Energy Agency annual report in 2009, WEO 2009 [5] as WEO 2009 450 Energy 
Strategy, and further elaborated in WEO 2011[6]. According to the IEA WEO 2011 Reference 
Scenario, by continuing present trends, global anthropogenic GHG emission from all sectors of 
human activity would reach 56.5 GtCO2-eq by 2020 and 64.4 GtCO2-eq by 2035, increasing from 
47.1 GtCO2-eq in 2009. Continuation of this trend would increase long-term CO2-eq concentration 
in excess of 1000 ppm and increase average temperature by up to 6 ºC, leading almost certainly to 
the irreparable damage to the planet. The environmentally sustainable WEO 2011 450 Energy 
Strategy, in line with the Copenhagen Accord and EU energy policy, aims to stabilize concentration 
at 450 ppm and limit temperature increase to 2 ºC. In WEO 2009 and later in WEO 2011, strong 
arguments are presented for this scenario. According to WEO 2009 450 scenario the estimated 
allowed limits on total GHG emission in 2030 and 2050 would be 37.1 and 21 GtCO2-eq  
respectively, whilst consistent figures in WEO 2011 450 strategy are 47.1 GtCO2-eq for 2020 and 
32.6 for 2035. They are lower than Reference scenario in 2035 by 31.8 GtCO2-eq and in 2050 by as 
much as 50.4 GtCO2-eq. The time scale appears to be too short for several carbon non-emitting 
technologies. The CCS technology is in the development stage for future applications, which will 
have to grow from the present experimental level of million tons per year to the scale of billion tons 
per year. Many hundreds or even thousands of safe non-leakage storage locations would be 
required. The future success of applications on such a scale cannot be taken for granted, at least not 
in next few decades. It could be many years before more definite predictions become possible. No 
solution can be seen in nuclear fusion, either. Even should the tokamak concept of nuclear fusion 
develop successfully physically and commercially, which is by no means certain, a significant 
contribution by nuclear fusion to the world energy production cannot be expected before 2065. This 
is evident from the dynamics of ITER and the follow-up projects (DEMO) before the first 
commercial plants could be constructed [7, 8]. Plasma ignition may be achieved at the laser fusion 
National Ignition Facility of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) this year or very 
soon, or in France at Megajoule facility, but the technological problems on the road to commercial 
power are so formidable that the predictions about energy production cannot be more optimistic 
[9,10]. As for the solar energy in spite of its large physical potential, it is less ready for large-scale 
deployment than wind energy. Some authors estimate two or three decades as a time needed to 
achieve economic competitiveness [11]. However, even when renewable sources of energy, such as 
wind and solar, become technically and economically ready for large-scale deployment, their 
intermittent nature of energy production would limit their share in total energy production, barring 
the development of energy storage at an acceptable cost, not in sight at present. Heat storage can 
resolve day-night cycle for concentrated solar energy installations in sunny periods, but not in 
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winter or for several cloudy days. Very large grids connecting wind and solar installations would 
smooth the variations, but would also remove independence on big systems, perceived as one 
advantage of renewable energy. Energy field is in transition and the picture depends on how far in 
the future we look. We have to understand that the rate of change in the field of energy differs from 
that of, say, communication gadgets which become obsolete in a year. Big energy installations take 
years to build and operate for decades. Change of energy technology is correspondingly slow 
process. We consider the period up to the year 2065, critical from the climate point of view, during 
which large contributions from CCS and fusion are not likely, while a large build-up of nuclear 
fission energy could be accomplished. In this period substantial contribution is expected from wind 
and solar energy, although still with economic limitations. Another important point to note is, if the 
aim is to reduce carbon emissions, as required by 2 ºC increase limit, build-up of carbon free 
sources should be as fast as possible. Nuclear fission, as developed energy source, can take the main 
burden while other non-carbon sources are not yet available on a large scale. The selected year 2065 
is a present judgment, a compromise between what is desirable and what seems technically feasible, 
regardless of current limited nuclear plans and present levels of renewable energy sources. Reduced 
nuclear strategies that would reach a high nuclear share later, by 2080 or as late as 2100, would, of 
course, provide more time for the development of the technical and political prerequisites for 
nuclear build-up, but their contribution to the urgent problem of CO2 emission would be diminished 
or too late, if we take the IPCC recommendations seriously. The next few years will tell us whether 
we can afford delays. Climatologists are warning us that we cannot [12, 3, 4]. Optimists generally 
believe that future is uncertain and that black climate change forecasts are still inadequately 
researched and even disputed. On the other hand, should the climate situation develop in an 
alarming way, demanding urgent measures and an earlier contribution of carbon-free energy, the 
final year of nuclear build-up could be moved back to about the year 2060, or even earlier. It would 
mean a correspondingly greater challenge to international nuclear industry. 
In order to be able to gain some quantitative insight about the necessity and potential of 
nuclear contribution for achievement of emission reduction in accordance with WEO 2011 450 
Energy strategy, we base our discussion on the energy strategy which achieves this aim with an 
energy production mix inclusive nuclear power [13, 14, 15]. Nuclear share in the mix is determined 
as a maximum attainable with established light-water nuclear technology, under constraints of 
consuming presently (2008) estimated uranium resources by 2065, and by abstaining from 
reprocessing of spent fuel and from introduction of fast breeders at least until that year. These 
technology and safety constrains on nuclear power are chosen having in mind the political problems 
associated with nuclear power and nuclear fuel cycle and with the need for public acceptance of 
nuclear contribution. The point of this exercise was not to propose this particular nuclear strategy, 
but to see whether under these constraints, which respect public concerns about nuclear technology, 
nuclear power can still give a substantial reduction of carbon emission. Postponement of fuel 
reprocessing and plutonium use at least until 2060 would offer the time for development of political 
institutions and efficient international control measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. As 
witnessed by Fukushima events, even the technologies with many years of experience can surprise, 
therefore postponement of introduction of breeder reactors or other not sufficiently proven 
technologies is advisable, in the interest of nuclear industry and would respond to general public 
attitude towards nuclear energy. 
 
2 EMISSION REDUCTION TARGETS 
The ‘‘Business-as-Usual’’ WEO 2009 Reference Scenario gives the energy-related carbon 
emission of 40.2 GtCO2 for 2030, and anthropogenic GHG emission of 56.5 GtCO2-eq. The total 
anthropogenic GHG emission according to the WEO 2009 Reference Scenario in 2050 is 68.4 
GtCO2-eq. WEO 2011 Business-as-Usual Reference scenario starts in 2009 with total 
anthropogenic emission amounting to 47.1 GtCO2-eq and runs few GtCO2 above the WEO 2009 
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Reference scenario. Predicted emissions for the years 2020 and 2035 are 56.5 and 64.4 GtCO2-eq, 
respectively. For the years 2050 and 2065, we extrapolate by following general trend and allowing 
for expected decrease of growth rate. Continuing on the increase of 7.9 GtCO2-eq in the period 
2020 to 2035 with increases of 7 and 6 GtCO2-eq in the next two 15 years intervals we obtain 71.4 
and 77.4 for the total anthropogenic emission in 2050, respectively in  2065. To obtain the WEO 
450 emission limit for the year 2065 we could extrapolate from the WEO 2009 450 total allowed 
anthropogenic GHG emission of 21 GtCO2-eq in 2050 to the year 2065 continuing with the 
2030/50 rate of decline, from 37.1 GtCO2-eq to 21 GtCO2-eq, into the 2050–2065 period. The 
extrapolated allowed anthropogenic GHG emission for 2065 would then come to 13.7 GtCO2-eq. 
However, with emission rate for early years in WEO 2011 being higher than predicted in WEO 
2009, emissions in the later of WEO 2011 years 2050 should be lower than in WEO 2009 if the 
integral emission should remain the same. Difference demonstrates the effects of delay in carbon 
emission mitigation measures. Recent analysis by Meinshausen et al. [16] puts the integral CO2 
emission limit to keep the probability of 2 ºC temperature rise below 0.25% at 1000 GtCO2 in the 
years 2000-2050, consistent with the earlier IPCC limit of 1800 GtCO2 for period 2000-2100 [17]. 
Any delay in reduction in early years must be compensated with sharper reduction in later years. So 
the revised values for WEO 450 trajectory for years 2050 and 2065 should be below 21 and 13.7 
GtCO2 figures in WEO 2009, close to 19 and 10 GtCO2-eq, which we take as working 
assumptions. Resulting WEO Reference and WEO 450 trajectories are shown in figure 1. To reduce 
the emission from the Reference Scenario level of 77.4 GtCO2-eq to the WEO 450 Scenario level 
of 10 GtCO2-eq, an emission reduction of 67.4 GtCO2 in the year 2065 would be needed. This 
would be a reduction of 87%. Several countries have already adopted drastic emission cuts as the 
basis for their energy strategies, at least as a declaration of understanding what should be done. 
Great Britain is committed to 80% cuts by 2050 relative to 1990 emission.  
  
3 NUCLEAR CONTRIBUTION IN AN ENERGY MIX SCENARIO 
We use above considerations of required total reduction from WEO Reference scenario to 
WEO 450 Scenario to get some quantitative insight on the required non-nuclear contributions. As 
we determine maximum nuclear contribution under conditions specified below, non-nuclear 
contribution which follows would be a minimum required to reach WEO 450 requirements.   Figure 
1 presents two WEO scenarios, reference, “business as usual”, and WEO 450 up to the year 2065. 
Our specified “maximum” nuclear scenario with a build-up in the years 2025-2065 would reach 
3300 GW by 2065. This level of nuclear power would be reached by linear nuclear power build-up 
starting in the year 2025 and proceeding until 2065. Rate of growth is obtained requiring that 
uranium resources as estimated in 2008 Red Book [18] be consumed by 2065. 
Second constraint defining maximum nuclear strategy is postponing of spent fuel 
reprocessing, respectively introduction of fast breeders until 2065, at least. Under these constraints 
maximum linear nuclear growth compatible with prescribed constraints is a constant growth by 71.8 
GW/year, and the resulting nuclear power of 3300 GW by 2065 is the maximum attainable under 
specified constraints. Linear growth was assumed as it gives larger emission reductions in earlier 
years than exponential growth. With determination and international effort such nuclear build-up 
could start by 2025. More discussion on that point can be found in [13]. This maximum nuclear 
contribution, not to be mixed with actual construction rate, serves to determine minimum non-
nuclear contribution required to reach the total emission reduction of 67.4 GtCO2-eq by 2065. 
Lower nuclear growth would imply increased requirements on non-nuclear contributions to carbon 
emission reduction in order to come down from WEO Reference scenario to the WEO 450 
Scenario. Nuclear carbon emission reduction in the year 2065 from operation of 3300 GW amounts 
to 25.2 GtCO2, assuming that nuclear power plant replace worst emitters, coal power plants. This 
would be  37.4% of required reduction, leaving remaining  42.2 GtCO2-eq , respectively 62.6% of 
total reduction required 67.4 GtCO2-eq, to be achieved by energy saving, increased efficiency of 
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energy use, forestry management, renewable energy sources, and a range of present and future 
methods and ways to cut carbon emission (Figure 1). Task is so enormous that no reasonable 
contribution should be neglected.  
 
 Figure 1: Emission reduction by linear nuclear build-up to 3300 GW in GtCO2-eq. The upper and bottom curve are the 
total anthropogenic emissions according the WEO 2011 Reference Scenario and the WEO 450 Scenario. The 2065 
values were extrapolated from predictions for up to 2050 in WEO 2009 and WEO 2011. 
Undoubtedly, with nuclear reduction greater than one-third, reduction of the remaining two 
thirds would be much easier to achieve. The question we aim to clarify is whether it is possible to 
forfeit or essentially decrease nuclear contribution and correspondingly increase burden on the non-
nuclear sources. For that we have to compare required reductions with the predictions or 
extrapolations of non-nuclear sources growth. Year 2065 is too distant for a reliable predictions 
about relatively fast developing renewable sources and many methods of energy saving. Yet, if we 
want to have some bases for creating comprehensive long term energy strategy with a mix of energy 
sources we must make some estimates about all of them. Attempting this we face first a difficult 
problem of quantifying effects of increased efficiency of energy use and of reduced energy use. 
Progress in this direction is going to take place in all sectors of energy use, industry, housing, 
transport, in countless small steps and innovations impossible to predict. Many more creative minds 
are working now on the energy problems than in the past era of cheap energy without climate 
problem. At present we have to make a guess on how much emission reduction can be expected 
from improvement of energy efficiency, from energy saving, from reduced deforestation and many 
other measures, some unknown today, that can reduce carbon emission.  
Without sufficient certainty about future development, we shall put our estimate into a wide 
range between 10 and 16 GtCO2-eq by 2065, respectively between 14.8 % and 23.7 % of the 
emission reduction required to come down from world anthropogenic emission in WEO Reference 
scenario to WEO 450 scenario in 2065. This range is supported by estimate for emission abatement 
by energy use efficiency and saving for the year 2035 as given in WEO 2011, figure 6.4. Emission 
reduction in 2035 amounts to about 6.4 GtCO2, respectively about 20% of the requirement for 
reaching WEO 450 trajectory from the anthropogenic emission WEO 2011 reference trajectory. As 
is recognized, efficiency and saving emission reductions are cost effective and expected to be 
introduced in early years, whilst new energy generating technologies are expected to dominate in 
later years. Both trends will act to reduce the share of energy efficiency and saving in emission 
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reductions in the years after 2035, probably well below 20%, consistent with our selected range for 
2065. The required contribution from renewable sources would consequently have to be between 
26.2 and 32.2 GtCO2/year in order to sum up to a total non-nuclear share of 42.2 GtCO2-eq.  
 
4 PREDICTIONS OF WIND AND SOLAR ENERGY CONTRIBUTION FOR THE 
YEAR 2065 
Assuming that renewable sources replace the coal power plants the required amounts of 26.2 
to 32.2 GtCO2 of annual emission reduction can be expressed as the corresponding amount of 
renewable electricity, again assuming replacement of coal power plants, (we use figure of 0.96 kg 
CO2/kWh for coal plants emission) from 27290 to 33540 TWh/year. These figures are the minimum 
required. When replacing gas power plants for a given amount of emissions more renewable power 
would be needed. With global average of wind energy conversion efficiency of 25%, which is 
probably overestimated, and with 15% for solar installations, we would come to the global average 
of about 20% for a system of about the same amount of wind and solar power. What will be the real 
ratio of these two main renewable sources contributions by 2065 depends on future developments, 
especially of solar materials. From our assumption of about equal contributions we obtain required 
installed power of these installations between 15500 GW to 19100 GW for 26.2 respectively 32.2 
GtCO2 of required emission reduction. How this requirement compares with the predictions on the 
future developments of renewable sources? Predictions as far in future as 2065 do not exist, 
although 40 years is a not a long period compared with the working life of a large power station. 
One reason is that some technologies, such as solar, are still rapidly evolving.  
  
4.1 Renewable sources in EU  
For European Union there is a prediction of renewable energy sources (RES) growth prepared 
by European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) [19] which goes up to 2050. Global prediction for 
wind energy is given by Global Wind Energy Council up to 2050 [20]. The predictions of RES 
capacities by EREC up to the year 2050 and our linear extrapolation to the year 2065 are given in 
Table 1. The contributions of RES to electricity production given by EREC up to the year 2050 and 
our linear extrapolation to the year 2065 are presented in Table 2. Acronyms, PV and CSP, stand for 
Photovoltaics and Concentrated Solar Power in both tables, respectively. 
Table 1 Predictions of renewable energy capacities (GW) by EREC in the “RE-thinking 2050”, forecasts for European 
Union (2011) up to 2050 with our linear extension to 2065 (last column) 
 2007 2020 2030 2050 2065 
Wind 56 180 288.5 462 592 
Hydro 102 120 148 194 228 
PV 4.9 150 397 962 1386 
Biomass 20.5 50 58 100 131 
Geothermal 1.4 4 21.7 77 118 
CSP 0.011 15 43.4 96 135 
Ocean  2.5 8.6 65 107 
Total RES-Capacity (GW) 185 521.5 965.2 1956 2697 
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Table 2 EREC: Contribution of renewable sources to electricity production (TWh) to 2050. Figures for 2065 are our 
linear extrapolation from the 2030-2050 period 
 2007 2020 2030 2050 2065 
Wind 104 477 833 1552 2091 
Hydro 325 384 398 448 485 
PV 5.4 180 556 1347 1940 
Biomass 102 250 292 496 649 
Geothermal 5.8 31 169 601 925 
CSP 0.8 43 141 385 568 
Ocean  5 18 158 263 
Total RES Energy (TWh) 543 1370 2407 4987 6921 
  
As our purpose is to judge the need for nuclear energy we include also the possibility of rapid 
growth of such renewable sources as wind and solar beyond 2050 up to 2065, in order to see 
whether in that case renewable energy could be sufficient. By extending EREC predictions 
exponentially the rapid growth from the period 2030-2050 up to the year 2065 (Table 3) we expect 
to obtain a very generous upper limit on the renewable energy production capacities in European 
Union for the year 2065. 
Table 3 EREC predictions of total renewable energy capacities in EU until 2050 and exponential extrapolation to the 
year 2065, installed capacity in GW 
Year 2020 2030 2050 2065 
RES Capacities (GW) 521.5 965.2 1956 3000 
 
First doubling occurs in 2020/30 period, in 10 years, second doubling in 2030/50 period in 20 
years. Our estimate assumes continuing 2030/50 rate with doubling in 2050/70 period, so 3000 GW 
in 2065 is the result of exponential growth up to 2065. So we proceed with linear extrapolation of 
2700 GW and with 3000 GW as the range for the upper limit of extension of EREC predictions for 
EU up to the year 2065. 
 
4.2 Some technical limits on the wind energy potential in EU  
Simple calculation [21] as well as examples of built wind farms (Whitelee wind farm, 
Scotland, 322 MW peak power on 55 square km, average power 2W/m2, and London Array, 
offshore wind farm, 1 GW peak on 245 km2, average power 1.5 W/m2) show that, due to physical 
and technical criteria on a distance between windmills, average power on the wind farms is not 
above 2 W/m2. Assuming that in densely populated European Union area about 10% of 4 500 000 
km2 area were covered with wind farms we obtain rough estimates of EU wind power potential. 
Building wind farms on some 450 000 km2, i.e. on the 10% of total EU area, and with 2 W/m2, i.e., 
450·109 m2 x 2 W/m2, we would obtain average wind power of 900 GW. Required installed peak 
power would be about 3500 GW, at 25% efficiency, as for such mass construction efficiency value 
of best location cannot be assumed. It should be noted that this technical limit is much higher figure 
than EREC extrapolation for 2065 which is below 1000 GW of installed power. All the same, is it 
realistic to see wind power in EU as replacement for nuclear power in the period up to 2065? 
Our global strategy assumed construction of 3300 GW of nuclear power by 2065 resulted in 
37% reduction of carbon emission required to reach WEO 2009 450 strategy. At present with about 
140 nuclear reactors in operation in EU, i.e. approximately one third of world number, one would 
expect that EU share in future global nuclear expansion be not less than one third. Clearly, in spite 
of present Fukushima conundrum, international solidarity would ask that main burden of nuclear 
development for carbon reduction falls on industrialized regions of the world; EU, US, and Far East 
regions which possess already developed nuclear industries. One would therefore expect from EU a 
share of at least 1100 GW of the global nuclear program of 3300 GW, on the level of present EU 




share in global nuclear power. If we extrapolate exponentially EREC prediction of installed wind 
power for 2050 of 462 GW to 2065, resulting 900 GW peak would certainly not suffice to replace 
1100 GW of nuclear power. With an average to peak power ratio of 25%, additional installed wind 
power would have to be some 4400 GW in order to replace 1100 GW of nuclear power, almost five 
times the EREC based (exponential) wind power prediction for 2065. It is also larger than the total 
wind power estimate for EU should wind farms cover 10% of EU area resulting in average power of 
about 900 GW and corresponding installed power about 3500 GW. 
 
4.3 Global estimates of wind power 
To obtain an idea on the upper limits of the wind power development for the world, we look 
at the Global Wind Energy Council and Greenpeace 2010 predictions given to the year 2050 [20]. 
WEC Survey of energy resources [22] does not give predictions for installed capacities in 2050 but 
discusses conditions which are important for wind power development. Highest prediction by 
GWEC-Greenpeace for the year 2050, designed as “advanced” variant, is 4.5 times above their 
“reference prediction” (880 GW), and amounts to 4000 GW of installed wind power. By 
extrapolating advanced variant with the 2% increase assumed before 2050, we obtain about 5400 
GW of installed power in 2065. Even this highest prediction, with optimistic assumption on average 
energy conversion efficiency (25%), and corresponding annual production of about 14000 TWh, 
leaves a large space to be covered by other renewable energy  sources in order to reach the required 
renewable energy carbon free energy production between 27290 and 33540 TWh remaining after 
contributions from 3300 GW of nuclear power and from the energy saving and increased efficiency 
of energy use, equivalent to 10 to 16 GtCO2-eq of emission reduction. It should be also noted that 
in case of very high expansion of wind power some material limitations may occur. One of these 
may be the scarcity of neodymium and dysprosium, rare earth elements needed in production of 
permanent magnets. 
 
4.4 Solar contribution in EU and globally 
According to EREC, again, solar photovoltaic (PV) and Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) 
installed in EU in 2050 would be some 1000 GW (peak) producing close to 2000 TWh of 
electricity. If, again, we assume doubling in the years from 2050 to 2070, we reach the figure of 
about 1500 GW peak in 2065 and the electricity production on the level of 3000 TWh.  With 
capacity factor of 0.8 one GW of nuclear power produces 7 TWh per year, so 3000 TWh could be 
produced by 430 GW of nuclear power. To estimate the physical limits on solar power in EU we 
can again use the value for solar energy density for EU region. Taking average solar power per m2 
of 100 W, a figure for Britain which cannot be far from average for EU [21] and energy conversion 
efficiency of 15% for mass produced solar photovoltaic cells we get the average solar power of 15 
W/m2, much larger than the average wind power. With an area of 9000 m2 per person in EU and 
with solar farms on the 10% of total area (which includes buildings, roads, water, arable land etc) 
we obtain average solar power per person in EU on the level of 15 W/m2x900 m2 = 13500 W, and 
energy production of 324 kWh per day per person. By transforming EU total energy consumption of 
1800 Mtoe [23] into equivalent amount in kWh, we obtain the considerably smaller figure (115 
kWh/day) for the average of primary energy consumption in 2010. Our physical limit on solar 
energy production would come to the high figure of about 59 000 TWh/year, while the total energy 
consumption in 2010 in EU amounted to 21 000 TWh. No doubt, even for relatively densely 
populated EU theoretical physical potential of solar energy is abundant enough to replace 1/3 of the 
nuclear reactors (EU share) from the global 3300 GW nuclear strategy shown in figure 1, i.e. 1100 
GW which would produce about 8000 TWh/year. Thus, in order to judge what could be real 
contribution of solar energy in the years to 2065 we must look into economic and technical 
parameters which limit the production of solar energy. With installed solar power at the end of 2011 
reaching 67 GW, solar energy production may reach 100 TWh in 2012. Can solar energy 




production be increased by several hundreds times by 2065 in order to replace nuclear contribution 
of about 26000 TWh (Figure 1) to carbon emission reduction? There is a very rapid increase of 
solar power from the present low level of solar power but sustained high growth and an increase by 
a factor of several hundreds in the course of 50 years cannot be taken as granted without 
consideration of essential developments of solar materials towards higher efficiency and lower 
costs. If such sustained high growth is to take place then also energy required to produce solar 
installations should come into consideration. If the installed power is to double in approximately 
every six years, as implied by growth with a factor of 300 in 50 years, then each operating solar 
installation should in six years produce at least the amount of energy for production of materials and 
construction of another installation. Energy balance or yield of an energy installation is expressed 
with the ratio between lifetime production of energy and the energy needed to produce required 
materials and construct the installation. For roof mounted solar installations yield would be in the 
range 5 to 10 depending on the technology and location [24, 25]. At the lower yield limit, applicable 
for developed northern world regions, and the lifetime of 20 years, 4 years would be needed to 
cover the energy for materials and construction. Applying this estimate to an expanding solar 
system with doubling time of five years we see that available net energy will be significantly 
reduced relative to the nonexpanding system. In our example about two thirds of energy produced 
would be used to support the expansion of the system. In the period of rapid growth from 5.4 GW in 
2005 to 67 GW in 2011 energy balance in growing system was definitely negative. This may not 
look so in the country which does not produce photovoltaic materials itself, but globally it is even 
worse if materials come from the country where coal is the main source of energy. The point we 
wish to make is that however large be the potential of solar energy it cannot be reached in a very 
short time. An increase by high factor (significantly larger than 1000 in 50 years) would pose a 
problem at least in the regions of lower yield factors. Another issue is economy. At present solar 
installations costs, economic burden on EU of building at least 4000 GW peak of solar photovoltaic 
installations in order to replace 1100 GW of nuclear power would be staggering. Even with the cost 
per unit peak power at the level of nuclear power, due to efficiency factor not above 0.2, the cost of 
solar installations per unit produced energy would be about 4 times higher. In production of large 
amounts of energy economic considerations have been decisive in the past, there is no reason to 
expect much change in the future. Globally, the theoretical sufficiency of solar energy is even more 
evident, as EU is not optimal location considering the intensity of solar radiation. However, for 
many regions where physical conditions for solar energy use are better, economic constraints are 
stronger, limiting development. Investments from developed industrial countries could help, but this 
is not an immediate future. Important point in this discussion is that we look at the period up to the 
year 2065, critical for the climate control. In spite of a large and in the long run abundant potential 
of solar energy, its contribution in coming decades is limited by economic constraints. With 
intensive development of solar materials this may change. This will certainly be a very welcome 
development. However, the known times from scientific discovery to the very large scale 
applications do not warrant that this will take place in the years up to 2065, early enough to 
abandon nuclear contribution. As we have noted, there is a physical limit on the rate of growth of 
solar installations beyond which the effect on carbon emission reduction becomes negative. 
 
4.5 Renewable energy on the world scale 
In view of cost disadvantage of renewable sources it can be expected that their large scale 
deployment will be undertaken largely by the developed industrial countries; EU as leading region, 
North America, but also by rapidly developing countries such as China and India where 
conventional fossil sources pose serious problems to environment. However, some relevant well 
founded predictions, rather than wishful thinking, for world renewable sources do not exist. It is 
however very important to have some picture about energy scene up to 2065. Large thermal power 
stations built now may be still operating in sixties. One generation in conventional energy 
production is much longer than in communication technology, while renewable sources technology 




is somewhere in between. We cannot answer the question on the need or not of nuclear power in 
2065 without some estimate on the probable or possible contributions from renewable sources. We 
venture to make a guess on the future of renewable sources fully aware of very large uncertainties. 
In view of this, our approach is to choose somewhat easier task, to make an upper limit estimate. 
Should the upper limit contribution from renewable sources turn out to be insufficient for coming 
down to WEO 450 strategy from the WEO reference strategy, argument will stand for nuclear 
contribution. To obtain estimate for global contribution of renewable energy we start from EREC 
(European Renewable Energy Council) predictions for EU and use it as guidance, trusting that their 
predictions do not underestimate the prospects for renewable energy. For North America we assume 
approximately equal contribution of renewable sources per capita as in EU; prediction analogous to 
EREC for North America would then come between 1800 and 2300 GW, figures corresponding to 
prediction range for EU region of 2700 and 3000 GW, respectively. For Asian region predictions 
are rather more uncertain. So globally we estimate probable upper limit of world renewable power 
in 2065 capacities (GW) and contribution to energy production (Table 2) by equating contributions 
of North America with that of India, and of China with EU. The projection of world RES installed 
power in the year 2065 is given in Table 4. 
















Region EU North Amer. India China Rest** World 
Estimated 
renewable    
power  GW 
 
2700-3000* 











*prediction range results from linear and exponential extrapolation of EREC values for 2050 to 2065  
**main contributors South Korea, Japan, Brazil, Indonesia  
      
In adopting these figures considerations were made of starting positions, population, rate of 
development, and of awareness of environmental problems. With all that, figures can be only 
tentative. So far economic science was reasonably good in explaining past events, but rather less 
successful in predictions. If the world had time to wait, better data would be available. Using the 
EREC average ratio between installed power and energy production (2.66 TWh/GW) i.e. the same 
average efficiency, we obtain in the last column a range of estimate for the upper limit of world 
renewable sources installed power. Corresponding values of annual energy production are 29260 
TWh and 36180 TWh. 
 
5 REQUIRED AND PREDICTED RENEWABLE SOURCES PRODUCTION 
These figures can be now compared with the required contributions of non nuclear energy 
sources as shown in Figure 1 in order to reach WE0 450 values of allowed emission. Within the 
analysis presented in Figure 1 when nuclear contribution of 25.2 GtCO2 is subtracted from the total 
reduction to WEO 450 trajectory amounting to 67.4 GtCO2-eq we obtain 42.2 GtCO2-eq to be 
covered by renewable sources, as well as energy efficiency and saving. As elaborated above, 
impossibility to predict energy saving and increased efficiency is reflected in a wide range for our 
prediction; from 10 GtCO2-eq to 16 GtCO2-eq of emission reduction in 2065. The reduction which 
would remain as a task for renewable sources would be, consequently, in the range from 26.2 
GtCO2 to 32.2 GtCO2 (Table 5). If these emissions were produced by coal power plants 
corresponding quantities of energy would be 27290 TWh and 33540 TWh. To replace coal plants 
this amount of energy would have to be produced by renewable energy sources. It would increase if 
the thermal power plants included gas plants. However, for our discussion we are interested in a 
minimum demand on renewable energy required to reach WEO 450 trajectory from the WEO 




Reference trajectory in 2065. We see that these values of required contributions from renewable 
sources correspond reasonably well with the figures for predicted renewable energy production in 
the range from 29260 to 36180 TWh, especially as we cannot be sure to reach highest emission 
reduction of 16 GtCO2-eq from the energy efficiency and saving sector, and highest production of 
36180 TWh by renewable energy sources.  
Table 5    Balance of emission reductions from the WEO 2011 Reference scenario to the WEO 450 strategy 
Emission reduction and produced energy 






Emission reduction by energy saving and 
increased efficiency in 2065 
10 GtC02-eq 16 GtCO2-eq 
Estimated reduction by renewable sources in 
2065 
32.2 GtCO2  26.2 GtCO2 
Required contribution of Renewable sources; 
corresponding required production in TWh 







Renewable sources range estimate of global 
energy production in TWh, corresponding 
average power in GW, and emission 
reduction in GtCO2 for the year 2065 
29260-36180 TWh  
 3340 – 4130 GW 
28.1-34.7 GtCO2                   
29260-36180 TWh 
 3340 – 4130 GW 
28.1-34.7 GtCO2 
  
Total required reduction to reach WEO 450 Strategy trajectory from WEO Reference strategy 
emission in 2065 amounts to 67.4 GtCO2-eq. (Fig.1). Figures refer to total anthropogenic 
emissions. Required contribution from renewable sources is obtained by subtraction of nuclear and 
energy saving and efficiency increase emission reduction from the total, third and fourth row. Two 
values given in the Table 5 for renewable sources production (last row) are linear and exponential 
extrapolation of EREC and GWEC data from the year 2050 to 2065 determining a range for 
predicted upper limit of renewable energy contribution. 
Interesting data are the estimates of cumulative carbon emission savings which follow from 
nuclear build-up to 3300 GW and of savings which would follow from the upper limit RES  
development. For nuclear case with linear build-up to 3300 GW in the years 2025-2065 for 
cumulative saving in the period 2015-2065 we obtain about 550 GtCO2. This would be a 
contribution limited by constraints of using proven conventional nuclear technology and once-
through fuel cycle. Estimates for renewable sources in their upper limit, as given in the last row of 
Table 5, are in the range of 600 GtCO2 for graded (faster growth in the first 20 years) exponential 
growth to 780 GtCO2 in case of linear growth in the 2015–2065 period. These figures can be 
compared with figures for cumulative carbon emission saving by renewable energy in SRREN [3] 
given for the period 2010-2050.  Cumulative saving for this period is given in the range 220-560 
GtCO2. As our estimate is the upper limit we compare it with SRREN upper limit which extended 
to 50 years period comes to about 700- 750 GtCO2,  again depending on growth rates. This is 
consistent with our estimate of RES saving in the range of 600-780 GtCO2. This also indicates that 
our upper limit on the renewable sources contribution by 2065 is not underestimated. Sum of the 
nuclear and RES emission savings is consistent with limits on cumulative emissions as given in [3] 
and [16]. 
6 DISCUSSION 
A look at the table 5 gives some quantitative insights about  the energy strategy that could by 
2065 fulfil the aim of reducing the carbon emission from the unacceptable WEO 2009(2011) 
Reference strategy down to the WEO 2009(2011) 450 strategy. With nuclear energy contribution 




defined by specific constraints and reaching 3300 GW of power by 2065, we obtain the required 
production of renewable energy by the year 2065. This is important as it can be compared with the 
predictions for build-up of renewable sources and offers an answer on the role of nuclear power in 
the same time period. We see that renewable energy predicted production could match the 
requirement, but only after nuclear power has given its contribution. Smaller nuclear contribution 
would require increased contribution of renewable energy. Without nuclear contribution production 
of renewable sources would have to be about doubled, which must be considered completely 
unrealistic in view of optimistic estimate of their production in 2065.  
Whilst these conclusions should be of importance for future structuring of energy plans and 
strategies, one should be aware of unavoidable limitations and several caveats should be given. The 
figures presented in Table 5 are, of course not predictions, they are an attempt to guess now about 
the future 50 years ahead. Nuclear build-up to 3300 GW by 2065 reducing CO2 emission by 25.2 
GtCO2 is a maximum based on the conventional uranium resources known in 2007, with 
conventional reactor technology and without fuel reprocessing and plutonium recycle. The point of 
selecting this nuclear strategy was to show what can be achieved with these, in our opinion, very 
desirable constraints. More detailed discussion on the reality of such nuclear contribution with the 
constraints imposed is given in our earlier study [13]. It also discusses the fuel sufficiency after 
2065. Further details which show that with advanced nuclear technologies of Generation 4 
sufficiency of nuclear fuel should not be a problem are given in [13,26]. We could not have the 
same confidence in predicting the contribution to emission reduction from energy saving, from 
increased efficiency of energy use and from many other ways, some unknown today, which could 
reduce carbon emission. In evaluation of nuclear contribution adopted constraints of conventional 
technology, fuel cycle and uranium resources help predictions, whilst the amount of emission 
reduction through energy saving and better use of energy will be determined by future 
developments and innovations. Thus, there is large range from 10 to 16 GtCO2-eq for reductions 
from that sector. Graphic presentation on Figure 2 should help to offer some further insights about 
future energy mix. Shadow belt is the range for the high prediction of contribution from renewable 
sources. Range is determined by linear, respectively exponential extrapolation from 2050 values.  
Boxes a) and b) depict a situation with lower and upper limit of reduction by energy saving and 
other ways of reducing emission outside power production sector, respectively. 
In estimation of future contribution from renewable sources we adopted high predictions 
based on European Renewable Energy Council and on Global Wind Energy Council, as shown in 
box c). From the box c) of the Figure 2 we see that by combining  the high production of renewable 
energy, corresponding to emission saving of 34.7 GtCO2 with the upper value of emission 
reduction by energy saving of 16 GtCO2-eq, required nuclear contribution would be reduced  to 
16.7 GtCO2 , respectively  to about 2190 GW in terms of installed power in 2065. With maximum 
contributions from renewable energy and from energy saving, 2190 GW of nuclear power would be 
needed and sufficient to cover the required reduction of 67.4 GtCO2-eq.   However, if with high 
predictions on contributions from both renewable sources and from energy saving, the need for 
nuclear contribution still remains, then a very important conclusion about the nuclear energy future 
follows. That is, 2190 GW of nuclear power seems to be the minimum required to reach the WEO 
450 trajectory in 2065. This would require about 1800 GW in addition to present about 380 GW. 
We pointed out that physical limits exist on the wind energy capacity and on the solar energy rate of 
growth. Should, hopefully, through intense international efforts high predictions on renewable 
sources be realized, then together with nuclear contribution with additional 1800 GW and with 
contributions from energy saving, efficiency increase etc, on the level of up to 16 GtCO2-eq, World  
could succeed in coming down from WEO 2011 Reference scenario to WEO 450 scenario by 2065. 
Clearly, only future developments will give more certainty. However, before we have more 
certainty this analysis tells us that abandoning nuclear contribution would be a risky game with the 
future of our planet. 





Figure 2: Graphic presentation of contributions to carbon or equivalent emission reduction by 2065 
  
Neither CCS, nor nuclear fusion is likely to give essential contribution before 2065, although 
it is impossible at present to foresee the role of these technologies in later years. Developments of 
photovoltaic materials are faster and situation would be different with drastic reduction of their 
costs. That may or may not happen soon enough. If delayed it may not be possible to benefit fully 
from it in the period up to 2065. Whilst physical potential of solar energy is undisputed, actual 
deployment is much lower, limited by economic considerations. Should future developments of 
solar materials remove economic disadvantages, there would still remain a physical limit on the rate 
of growth preventing a very rapid build-up of solar power. If we cannot be sure of timely and 
favourable developments, we must plan for less favourable and the technologies we now have at our 
disposal.  Nuclear technology is one of these. Whilst one can place solar installations in a number of 
sun-rich countries, nuclear contribution should come primarily from industrialized countries and 
regions which have industry, knowledge and experience in the field required to build reliable and 
safe nuclear power plants. This may be one lesson of Fukushima accident. EU is one such region, 
and is also a region with high intensity of carbon emission. If we accept that climate problem will 
not be resolved without nuclear energy then EU would fail in its responsibility and in solidarity 
with the less developed regions of the world by not contributing to carbon emission reduction in the 
critical period to 2065 with its nuclear energy sector for which EU possesses an outstanding 
potential and capabilities. With all the unavoidable uncertainties we hope this study offers some 
guidance for the future energy strategies. 
 





Considering the necessity and future role of nuclear energy as relevant to the climate problem, 
we have focused on the period to the year 2065. The reasons for this choice are twofold; first, this is 
a critical period for achieving the essential 80% CO2 emission reductions and, secondly, this is the 
period during which large contributions from fusion and carbon separation and storage are not 
likely. For quantification of the required emission reduction we have used IEA WEO 2009 and 
WEO 2011 data as presented in their Reference strategies predicting emissions with business as 
usual practices, and WEO 450 Energy strategies which show the time development of allowed 
emissions consistent with a limit on the global temperature increase of 2 ºC and the peak CO2 
concentration of 450 ppm. From the 2035 and 2050 values of total anthropogenic CO2eq emissions 
given in WEO 2011 and WEO 2009 we extrapolated the Reference strategy and WEO 450 strategy 
to the year 2065. With Reference emission in 2065 reaching 77.4 GtCO2-eq and WEO 450 strategy 
allowing emission of 10 GtCO2-eq we obtain the reduction required by 2065 amounting to 67.4 
GtCO2-eq in order to come down to sustainable WEO 450 trajectory. Main carbon non-emitting 
sources assumed in the years up to 2065 are proven technology nuclear fission and renewable 
sources. Shorter period, more desirable from the climate control view, would correspondingly 
increase technical and economic demands in development of required carbon free energy 
production capacities. Even with the year 2065 as a compromise there is a giant task facing 
renewable sources in the mixed energy strategy which includes nuclear power, if by that year total 
anthropogenic GHG emission is to be reduced to 10 GtCO2–eq. In our specified strategy aimed to 
achieve WEO 450 target we assumed an energy mix including nuclear power build-up in the period 
2025-2065 to the level of 3300 GW in 2065.  With the resulting nuclear contribution of 25.2 GtCO2 
to the total required reduction down from the WEO 2009 reference strategy amounting to 67.4 
GtCO2 in 2065, what  remains for renewable sources, energy saving and increased efficiency of 
energy use to contribute are prodigious 42.2 GtCO2-eq. In the absence of estimates about 
contribution of renewable sources going as far as 2065, we had to make reasonable guesses trying 
not to underestimate their possible contributions. Relevant energy policy cannot be deduced by 
looking only two or three decades in advance when construction and the lifetime of energy 
installations can be 50 years or more. Our estimates are based on EREC prediction for EU and on 
our extension to world total with EREC and GWEC prediction as a guide. Resulting contributions 
by renewable sources, probably their upper limits, allow some conclusions about the role of nuclear 
energy in future decades. Assuming that energy saving and more efficient energy use will by 2065 
effect an annual reduction between 10 to 16 GtCO2-eq, remaining 26.2 to 32.2 GtCO2, respectively 
27290 and 33540 TWh would be the task for the renewable energy sources as presented in Table 5 
and in Figure 2. Our high, but still credible estimates of predicted world renewable energy 
contribution by 2065 come to the similar figures between 29260 and 36180 TWh. However, as is 
evident from Table 5 and Figure 2, even so without nuclear contribution in 2065, renewable energy 
contribution would have to be doubled, practically impossible task in the time period in 
consideration and in view of their generous predictions. By combining highest contributions from 
energy saving, efficiency increase and other measures to reduce emission, apart from energy 
production, with highest prediction for renewable sources contribution, we obtain the minimum 
nuclear energy requirement of about 2190 GW in 2065.  This minimum nuclear strategy should be 
planned and prepared for, unless there is strong evidence that other carbon free energy sources 
(CCS or fusion) could be developed in time.  Expansion of nuclear power by about 1800 GW by 
2065 would come from different and already developed industrial sector, which can give its 
contribution to the energy mix, without obstructing the build-up of renewable sources. It would not 
be wise to forfeit nuclear contribution at least in the period to 2065, critical for the control of 
climate change. 
 




8 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF NUCLEAR POWER 
1. After combining a reasonably largest  prediction of carbon emission reduction from the 
renewable sources (36180 TWh, respectively 34.7 GtCO2 in 2065) with a maximum predicted 
reduction from energy saving, efficiency increase and other non-energy methods of carbon emission 
reduction (16 GtCO2-eq in 2065), about 16.7 GtCO2 of further reduction is still missing in order to 
reach a total of 67.4 GtCO2-eq required to bring in the year 2065 the WEO Reference energy 
strategy down to the WEO 450 energy strategy  limiting the global temperature increase to 2 °C. 
2. Gap could be closed by operating about 2190 GW of nuclear power in 2065. In view of the 
assumed high predictions for renewable energy and for energy saving, this figure should be 
considered a minimum future need. Plans for about 1800 GW of nuclear power, additional to 
presently operating about 360 GW should be discussed and coordinated. For political, technical and 
public reasons, plans should be realized with proven conventional technology and with once 
through fuel cycle, while the new technologies can be prepared for the years after 2065. 
3. Whilst the need for nuclear (fission) power appears to be clear for the period to about 2065, 
its long term future will be determined by developments of alternatives such as CCS or nuclear 
fusion. Nuclear future will also depend on whether the period up to 2065, during which 
conventional nuclear technology without reprocessing can be adequate, will be used for 
development of political and technical institutions and technologies for the safe use of U238 and 
Th232 that would make nuclear fission practically inexhaustible source of energy. 
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